approaching the point where disputes between the two wings of the Soviet would be decided not by arguments but by force of arms.

UNREST IN PETROGRAD

After the failure in Kronstadt, the Communists concentrated their efforts on the Petrograd garrison. Through agitation against orders to alert companies for the front they had aroused the soldiers' suspicions of their representatives in the Tauride Palace, who had voted to strengthen the army. By kindling these suspicions, the Communists persuaded the soldiers to elect, in addition to their deputies to the Soviet, a special conference of regimental representatives to discuss questions directly concerning the enlisted men. Since the greatest concern of the men in reserve regiments was how to dodge service in the trenches, the new conference rapidly developed into a shield to protect the dodgers against the hardships of the front. In no time the conference became strong enough to challenge the Soldiers' Section of the Petrograd Soviet. On June 24 it unanimously rejected the plan that had been prepared by the government and accepted by the Soldiers' Section to amalgamate the reserve regiments with corresponding units in the active army. The conference substituted its own demands: to supply the Petrograd regiments with no fewer than twenty-four machine guns per battalion, let enlisted men elect officers and demote those they disliked, and leave the reserve regiments in Petrograd to defend the revolution.

A conference of Petrograd factory councils was called in the Tauride Palace to discuss workers' grievances. Bolsheviks predominated in the conference, and their resolution demanding the transfer of all power to the Soviets was passed by an overwhelming majority. We still had a majority in both sections of the Soviet, but this majority was now offset by the conference of regimental representatives and the factory councils controlled by the Bolsheviks.

This situation meant a new wave of unrest in factories and barracks, and for me, personally, more sleepless nights with speeches before sullen, hostile crowds. But we were far from acknowledging defeat. The innumerable delegations that came to the Tauride Palace from all corners of Russian and all points of the front sustained our conviction that the great majority of the people supported our policy. The split was not between the majority in the Executive Committee and the masses of the Russian people, but between a part of the Petrograd workers and the bulk of the workers and peasants in the nation; be-